We examine project selection decisions of …rms constrained in the number of projects they can handle at once. Taking on a project requires a commitment of uncertain duration, restricting the …rm from selecting another project in subsequent periods. Due to the capacity constraints and need for commitment, some positive return projects are rejected. In a sequential move dynamic game, the …rst mover strategically rejects some projects that are then selected by the second mover, even when both …rms are symmetric and equally informed. We study the e¤ects of competition on project selection, and compare the jointly optimal selection decision to the behavior of strategic non-cooperative …rms.
Introduction
Firms as well as researchers and government agencies repeatedly select projects (e.g., research and development projects, clients to serve, acquisition of start-ups, and new products). In many situations, the …rms are constrained in the number of projects they can work on at once. If a …rm takes on a project, it may last for a number of periods, during which the …rm's resources (e.g., researchers'and other employees'time, physical space, lab equipment) are committed. Firms' project selection decisions are made under uncertainty about the duration of the project being considered and about the value of future project opportunities.
Committing limited resources to one project may result in the need to forgo future, perhaps more pro…table, projects.
Firm's project selection decisions are often taken in strategic environments. When …rms search in a common pool, one …rm's decision to select a project can a¤ect its rival's opportunities, at present, because this project is no longer available, and in the future, because the …rm commits its resources. Additionally, when a …rm takes on a project it can a¤ect not only its own payo¤s but may also result in payo¤ externalities.
In our model, two …rms play a dynamic, in…nite horizon game. Every period a new project opportunity arises. The expected return of each project is randomly drawn from a given distribution. Firms learn the expected return of the current project, and know the distribution from which future project returns are drawn. A project has random duration.
For a …rm that is currently committed to a project, we assume a …xed probability that the project will end by the next period. Each period, if one of the …rms is committed and the other is free, the free …rm can select the project or reject it. If both …rms are free, one …rm is chosen at random to be that period's leader -the …rst …rm to consider the project. If the period's leader rejects the project, the period's follower can consider selecting it. Thus we assume that the selection decisions are taken sequentially. This is the case for example when pharmaceutical companies repeatedly face project opportunities presented by small biotech …rms who negotiate with the pharmaceutical companies sequentially. 1 Service providers (e.g., consulting …rms, contingent fee lawyers, contractors) are sequentially approached by clients, and need to decide if to take the client knowing that accepting requires commitment, and rejecting sends the client to another …rm.
If projects did not require commitment, in a symmetric game, a leader would take on any project with a positive return, and a follower would never take on any project. But, since projects can last longer than one period, and require commitment of resources, some positive return projects are rejected by both …rms. A leader selects projects that have high enough returns. Interestingly, when projects require commitment, we show that there are projects with intermediate levels of return that are rejected by the period's leader, yet selected by the follower. This is true even though both …rms are identical, expect the same future opportunities and have the same information about the value of the current project.
Intuitively, a follower still wants to take on an intermediate value project because its return is su¢ ciently high, and if he rejects it, no one will take on this project. But the leader prefers to reject the intermediate value project knowing that the follower will select it, as the leader can enjoy less competition in the following period when a more pro…table project may arise.
To examine the e¤ects of competition on project selection behavior, we compare the outcome of the game to two benchmarks: a decision maker with a capacity of one project, and a decision maker with a two-project capacity. The …rst of these problems is similar to existing sequential search models, and is included for comparison with the strategic situation.
We …nd that project selection thresholds are lower under competition. That is, a duopolist …rm selects projects that it would not have selected absent a competitor in the market. We then compare equilibrium selection to the optimal choice of a joint venture (maximizing sum of pro…ts with a two-project capacity). We …nd that in duopoly competition, …rms reject too many projects compared to the jointly optimal behavior.
Our main model assumes that the leader in each period is chosen at random. This assumption is natural when …rms are symmetric, and illustrates the incentive to keep a rival busy. However, in some cases, one might expect one of the …rms to have an advantage (perhaps it is better known, or more easily accessible) and be the leader with a higher probability than its rival. We study a version of the game in which one …rm is the leader in every period. In this asymmetric game, the follower will be less selective than the leader for an additional reason: project opportunities for the follower arise from an inferior (right censored) distribution of project returns, because when free, the leader selects the most promising projects.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we discuss related literature. In Section 3, we describe the basic model with a single decision maker. In Section 4, we develop the game and analyze the strategic interaction between two …rms. In Section 5, we analyze the dominant …rm version. Section 6 concludes.
Related Literature
Our paper is related to a few distinct bodies of literature: sequential search, particularly, models of strategic interaction between a small number of searching agents, queueing theory in operations research, and a literature on project selection. We describe some of the existing literature and our contribution.
The section of our paper that focuses on the decision maker is closely related to labor search models. In early job search models (e.g., McCall, 1970; Mortensen, 1970) , workers cannot search for a job while employed, and staying employed is better than becoming unemployed. In Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), workers continue searching for better jobs while employed, thus in these models there is no binding commitment. In a job search model, the worker obtains a ‡ow income for the duration of employment. In contrast, we assume that the …rm's expected value from a completed project is independent of the development duration. Our …rm needs to commit resources until the project is complete. When the project ends, the …rm is free to select an additional pro…table project without forgoing the returns of the completed project. For example, when a …rm completes a service to a client, it will be paid an amount agreed on in advance. Whereas a worker fears a layo¤, our …rm eagerly awaits project completion.
Our model contributes to a surprisingly small category of strategic search models in which selectivity is taken as the main strategic variable. 2 Reinganum (1982 Reinganum ( , 1983a Our model di¤ers from the strategic search models in several important ways. In these models, the agents search in di¤erent pools. The interaction comes from the e¤ect that the other agent's search outcome has in a subsequent stage. In contrast, in our model, the selectivity of a …rm a¤ects the distribution of projects faced by the other …rm both in the same period and in subsequent periods. In our model, whether a …rm is committed to a project is common knowledge, and a …rm's best response depends on the current state.
Additionally, our …rms alternate between periods of search and periods of development. This is a common setting in job search models, but, to the best of our knowledge, it has not been analyzed in a strategic search game.
Our work is also related to a literature in operations research on queuing. In an early contribution, Lippman and Sheldon (1969) characterized the optimal strategy of a single server who faces clients with di¤erent rewards and expected service times. In queueing models, typically there are servers that can serve one customer at a time. Customers randomly arrive, they choose a strategy, (for example to join the queue or not) to maximize their payo¤s-bene…ts from the service minus cost of waiting. A central issue in this literature is how to reduce individual waiting time (see Hassin and Haviv, 2003) . A subset of papers in this area examines strategic interactions between servers. For example, Kalai, Kamien and Rubinovitch (1992) study competition between servers on service speed. In contrast, we take the service speed as given, and focus on …rms'selectivity when projects take random values and …rms compete over the same projects. Our …rms care about projects'values and payo¤ externalities, and not just about market shares. In our model, projects that are not selected are lost rather than placed in a queue.
In the management literature, the closest to our paper is Cassiman and Ueda (2006) .
in this paper) is not an issue. Selectivity is the decision variable also in models of labor markets with many …rms and workers, such as Pissarides (1985) .
They model the interaction between an established …rm deciding whether to commercialize innovations and (sequential) startup …rms. A key assumption, as in our paper, is that the …rm can commercialize only a limited number of innovations. They assume a Nash bargaining while we take a non-cooperative game approach. In our model, a project has a …nite uncertain duration while Cassiman and Ueda restrict to irreversible commercialization (in…nite duration). This, together with their e¢ cient allocation of projects that results from
bargaining, allows them to analyze a more general capacity of J innovations while we restrict to one or two projects for tractability.
Papers on capital allocation in management mostly consider the decision to …nance a single project, and focus on information asymmetry (see, for example, Harris and Raviv, 1996 and Zhang, 1997). Hall and Lerner (2010) survey the literature on …nancing of innovation with a focus on …nancial market reasons for under-investment. Our assumption on …rms' project capacity constraint is di¤erent from the standard capital …nancing constraint. Firms can be limited in the number of projects they select even if they have cash reserves, or access to venture capital. 3 Dixit and Pindyck (1994) survey work on investment under uncertainty. When …rms are uncertain about the returns of (irreversible) capital investment, an opportunity to delay investment gives the …rm a call option. 4 
Basic Model
We begin by describing the model in the context of a decision maker -a single …rm that repeatedly decides whether to select projects that arise sequentially. We add strategic interactions between two …rms in the next section.
Consider a discrete time in…nite horizon model. The decision maker maximizes the discounted sum of expected payo¤s. The discount factor is 0 < < 1: A new project opportunity arises every period. If the decision maker is not currently committed, he can 3 Capacity constraints could arise due to a limited number of skilled scientists and engineers, limited physical space to run experiments, etc. Capacity constraints rather than budget constraints are used also in the literature on rational inattention, see Sims (2010) . 4 Our problem has also some similarity to the problem of dynamic assignment of a single durable object to successive agents, considered by Bloch and Houy (2012) .
decide whether to select this project. A project requires a commitment of resources, which prevents the …rm from working on more than one project at a time. Binding commitments to a project can arise due to agreements with clients, employees, or suppliers, or because the …rm cannot search for new opportunities while working on the current project. It is also possible that projects require a sunk cost that makes abandoning a project, even for a better one, not worthwhile.
When faced with a project opportunity, the …rm is uncertain how long the project would take. To capture the random duration of projects, we assume that if a …rm is committed, the commitment will end by the next period with a probability p 2 [0; 1] : For example, for a service provider, project duration can be the time it takes to complete the service; for a …rm engaged in acquisitions, the time it takes to transfer knowledge from the innovator to the …rm, to develop the product, and to come up with a marketing strategy.
Each project has a randomly drawn return v; which is the expected discounted present value of net bene…ts from the project at the time it is selected. We assume project returns are identically and independently drawn from a known distribution with a cumulative dis- is di¤erentiable with a …nite density f (v) > 0. 5 The expected value of returns is positive. R vf (v)dv > 0. We treat the payo¤ v as obtained immediately because this simpli…es the exposition. But given our assumption of a binding commitment to the project, the analysis is similar if the prize is obtained at the end of the commitment period (e.g., an agreed payment when a service is completed), or if ‡ow pro…ts start at that time (e.g., pro…ts from launching a new product), or if a ‡ow cost is incurred for the duration of the project commitment. The value v should be interpreted as the net expected value at the time the decision is made.
The payo¤ in a period in which no project is selected is zero.
A Decision Maker' s Project Selection
Let us denote the value function in any period for which the decision maker is not committed, before realization of the project's return, by V 0 . Let V 1 denote the value function for the decision maker who is committed from an earlier period.
When the decision maker is committed, he cannot select another project. Thus,
When he is free, he chooses to select or not to select so as to maximize:
Thus, a project is selected if v v 0 where:
The value in the state without commitment is:
In a model without commitment (p = 1); the selection threshold would be v 0 = 0: But when projects require commitment (p < 1) ; some positive return projects are rejected. In Proposition 1, we examine how the unique optimal threshold changes with the parameters of the model. The return from selected projects is expected to be higher in an industry in which …rms typically commit to projects that take a long time to complete. In the pharmaceutical industry, for example, it takes about 10 years to bring a drug to the market (see Nicholas, 1994 ). In terms of our model, p is low in this industry. Thus we would expect higher selection thresholds compared to industries with projects of shorter commitment, as perhaps is true in the context of software development.
If project opportunities arise frequently, then the project selection threshold would be higher than for infrequent arrivals. This is because in such situation is higher and p is lower. Hence, we would expect a decision maker who frequently faces project opportunities to select higher return projects, than a decision maker who encounters project opportunities infrequently.
The threshold for selection is higher for the dominating distribution, because there is a higher probability that a better project will arise in the following periods. The threshold for selection is higher for the spread, because under the riskier distribution, one can expect higher return projects, and also lower return projects. The …rm can enjoy higher return project yet not be harmed for the lower return ones that it would reject.
Two-Project Capacity Constraint
We now consider a decision maker who can work on two projects at a time. We compare project selection of this less constrained …rm to the single project capacity of the previous subsection. We also use the two-project capacity model later, when comparing a duopoly to a joint venture.
We denote the value functions of the decision maker with a two-project capacity with W i ; to distinguish from that of the single project capacity values V i . The index i 2 f0; 1; 2g in W i refers to the number of projects to which the decision maker is committed. In state 2, the decision maker cannot select a project. The optimal choices in states 0 and 1 are given by thresholds of selection w 0 and w 1 ; respectively. Similar to our analysis in the previous section, we write the system of dynamic programming equations that characterizes optimal decisions of the two-project capacity decision maker. The value in state 2 (when the …rm is committed to two projects) is:
In state 1, the threshold level satis…es:
The value functions in state 1 is:
In state 0, the threshold level satis…es:
The value function in state 0 is:
Equations (4)- (8) de…ne the solution to the optimal decision of the …rm who can work on at most two projects at a time. We …rst show that the decision maker is less likely to select a project when she has already committed resources to one project, i.e., w 1 > w 0 .
Proposition 2 For a decision maker who can work on at most two projects, the selection threshold is higher when one project is underway than when it is not committed, w 1 > w 0 .
If the …rm has not yet selected any project, taking on the current project will tie resources but still leave an opportunity to select another promising project in the next period. However, for a …rm that is already committed to one project, taking on a second project means that it cannot take on an additional project until the commitment to one of the projects ends, making the …rm more selective. 6 Comparing …rms with di¤erent capacity constraints, we …nd that the single project decision maker has a higher threshold of selection compared to the threshold of selection of the two-project capacity …rm, even when the two-project capacity …rm has already committed resources to one project. Intuitively, for the two-project capacity …rm, when all its resources are committed, the expected time until at least one of the commitments is relieved is shorter 6 Interestingly, the inequality w 1 > w 0 remains true in the limit where …rms are in…nitely patient ( ! 1);
when the …rm is assumed to maximize the expected payo¤ per unit of time. The …rm prefers to spend more time in states 0 and 1 than in state 2 (where it is committed and cannot accept projects). Setting w 1 > w 0 is a way to steer the system back towards state 0; as it gets closer to state 2:
than for the single project capacity …rm who has committed all of its resources. This is because the probability that one of the two projects ends is larger than the probability that one project ends.
Proposition 3 A …rm that has a capacity of one project has a higher selection threshold than a two-project capacity …rm, even when the two-project capacity …rm has already committed resources to one project, i.e., v 0 > w 1 .
An implication of Proposition 3 is that the average return of selected projects is larger for a …rm that has a more stringent project capacity constraint. The constrained …rm does not select some relatively low return projects that the less constrained …rm would select.
Strategic Project Selection
In this section, we examine the project selection decisions in a duopoly setting. One …rm's decision a¤ects the payo¤s of the other. We assume that a project can be selected by only one …rm. We examine project selection strategies and the e¤ects of competition on project selection.
The Game
We consider competition between two …rms A and B. Every period, a new project opportunity with a value v drawn from the distribution F (v) arises. If one …rm is committed to an earlier project and the other is free, the free …rm can decide if to select the project. If both …rms are free, one is chosen at random (with a probability 1 2 ) to be that period's leader-the …rst …rm to make a decision to select the project or not. If the period's leader selects the project, the follower cannot take on a project in that period. If the period's leader rejects the project, the follower can decide whether to select it. As we assumed in Section 3.1, a …rm can work on at most one project at a time and the commitment of resources ends each period with a probability p.
For a project with return v to the selecting …rm, the return for the other …rm is v; where 2 ( 1; 1) : If a …rm's project selection has no e¤ect on the market pro…ts of the other …rm, = 0. This might be the case when a project is a service to a client. A …rm can su¤er a negative externality when the other …rm selects, < 0; for example if the project is a new technology that gives the selecting …rm a cost advantage in some product market. 7 A …rm can enjoy a positive externality when the other …rm selects the project, > 0; for example when there are technology spillovers. Payo¤s v and v can also represent Stackelberg payo¤s with the selecting …rm being the market leader. We assume that the externality is smaller in magnitude than the return for the selecting …rm, j j < 1: If no …rm selects the project, payo¤s are zero for each …rm.
We restrict attention to Markov strategies. A …rm's decision will only depend on the current state. States of the world are denoted by (i; j); where i; j 2 f0; 1g. In a state with i = 0; …rm A is not committed and in a state with i = 1; …rm A is committed. Similarly, j
indicates the commitment of …rm B.
We look for a symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium. The value function (before realiza- . We say that a threshold is interior if it is in the range (v; v), so that in every state in which at least one …rm is free, the lowest value project is rejected, but the highest value project is accepted.
Analysis
We derive the conditions that de…ne the equilibrium thresholds of selection and the values.
In state (1; 1) ; both …rms are committed and no …rm can select a project. Next period's 7 Thomas (2013) analyzes a model of strategic experimentation with a negative externality. In her model, two players can choose between a risky and a safe option. Each player has exclusive access to a risky option.
But they share the safe option that can only be used by one player at a time. Our results are not directly comparable as the models di¤er signi…cantly. state depends on whether each of the …rms is freed from its previous commitment. The value in state (1; 1) is thus given by:
In state (0; 1), one …rm is free, and can choose to select the project or to reject it so as to maximize:
An interior threshold return for selection satis…es: Using the threshold v 0;1 ; the value functions in states (0; 1) and (1; 0) are:
In state (0; 0), one of the …rms is chosen at random to be the leader who can consider the project …rst. If this …rm does not select the project, then the follower faces the choice:
If the threshold is interior, it satis…es:
We de…ne v will select if it has the opportunity to do so, then the …rst …rm faces the choice:
The …rm would select this project if v e v where:
We 
Strategic Rejection of Projects
In the special case where p = 1; each project lasts only one period. The commitment of resources is not a binding constraint. It follows immediately from the system above that 8 We conjecture that v In this case, a …rm will select any project that has a positive expected return, and the follower will never select a project that the leader rejected. We assume from now that p < 1, so that commitment is necessary.
In the presence of a rival, a …rm's equilibrium strategy depends on whether its rival has previously committed resources. We show that a …rm strategically rejects some projects that it would have selected had its rival been committed v While the general patterns of project selection we described above hold for any value of the externality parameter 2 ( 1; 1), clearly the equilibrium thresholds depend on the :
For long duration projects, we show that the thresholds decrease with . 9 In the presence of positive externalities, the thresholds of selection are lower (more projects taken on by the …rm) than in the presence of negative externalities. Intuitively, a …rm is less worried about committing its resources, because it expects to bene…t also from future projects that its opponent selects. We next compare the equilibrium selection behavior to two benchmarks. First, in Section 4.4, we compare the behavior of a …rm with a one project capacity constraint to that of an equally constrained monopolist (a single project decision maker). Then, in Section 4.5, we compare the outcome of the non-cooperative game to that of two …rms that collaborate to achieve the highest total payo¤.
Competition and the Project Selection
A vast literature in economics debates the relation between market structure and innovation (see Gilbert, 2006 , for a survey). Our model o¤ers a new look at this question in comparing project selection in a monopoly market structure to that in a duopoly market when projects require commitment of resources, and …rms are constrained to work on at most one project at a time.
To examine the e¤ects of competition on project selection, we compare the selection strategies in the duopoly game we analyzed earlier in this section to the selection behavior of the single decision maker we studied in Section 3.1. We show that the threshold of return for a project to be selected is lower when two …rms compete than when there is a single decision maker. Thus, in a duopoly market, more projects are selected than in a monopoly market (even though we assumed project opportunities arise at the same rate regardless of 9 The condition that p is small is su¢ cient but not necessary. The derivatives were too complex to sign for general values of p: market structure). However, since the threshold of selection is higher for the monopolist, the monopolist will tend to work on projects that have a higher expected return.
Proposition 6 Selection thresholds are lower in duopoly competition than for a monopolist:
The comparison in Proposition 6 is done under the assumption that the project return is drawn from the same distribution in the single decision maker's problem and in the game.
If the …rm enjoys a higher return from any project when it is alone in the market, the distribution of returns in the decision maker's problem may dominate that in the duopoly case. As we have shown in Proposition 1, this would imply an even higher threshold of selection. So the result of Proposition 6 holds even if the monopolist earns more from each project compared to the duopolist.
The comparison made in this section assumes that the monopolist is also a …rm that is constrained to work on at most one project at a time. We analyze the comparison between the duopoly and a monopolist who has a two-project capacity in the next section.
Joint Decision versus the Non-cooperative Game
The two-project capacity version we analyzed in Section 3.2 allows us to compare project selection decisions of strategic non-cooperative …rms with the decision of a joint venture. We adjust the system of equations (4)- (8) which was derived for the two-project capacity …rm so that the return from a selected project is v (1 + ), which is the sum of payo¤s in the game we solved in the previous section (the revised system is stated in the proof of Proposition 7). We denote again these thresholds by w i : We are interested in two comparisons. First, we compare the selection threshold of the joint venture that is committed to one project, but can still select another (w 1 ) ; to the selection threshold of non-cooperative …rm that is not committed and has a rival who is committed (v 0;1 ). In both these cases, one …rm is committed and one is free. Second, we compare the threshold of the joint venture when it is free of commitments (w 0 ), to the selection threshold above which at least one of the non-cooperatively competing …rms in the game selects the project when both …rms are free of commitment v 2 0;0 . In both these situations, the two …rms are free.
Proposition 7 A non-cooperatively competing duopolist has higher selection thresholds compared to the jointly optimal decision maker, w 1 < v 0;1 and w 0 < v 2 0;0 :
To prove this proposition, we …rst argue that the joint decision maker can obtain at least as high a value in state 0 as the sum of values of both …rms in the game in state (0; 0) ; i.e., W 0 2V 0;0 . This is true because the decision maker can mimic the equilibrium selection strategies in the game. We then derive the given inequalities on thresholds from the systems of dynamic programming equations. Proposition 7 suggests that competition between …rms with capacity constraints on project selections results in these …rms setting too high a bar for selection, compared to what would be optimal for them under joint decision making.
A Dominant Firm
Our analysis in Section 4 assumed that the two …rms are symmetric, in particular, that the order by which they are presented with a project is random. Our …nding that a follower selects a project that was rejected by the leader is perhaps the most striking in a symmetric setting. Asymmetry could be another reason why …rms sometimes reject projects that their rivals then select. Clearly, if the leader values a project less than the follower, the follower might select a project that the leader rejected. But even if two …rms agree on the value of a project, there can be asymmetry in the determination of priority (who gets to choose …rst). It is possible that one …rm has an advantage and is more often the …rst to consider a project. For example, one …rm may be better known, or easier to approach, or project ideas may start within this …rm. Ueda predict that the established …rm (who is always the leader) will choose to commercialize internal innovations with lower pro…tability compared to the innovations they leave for external developers. They note however that this prediction is not in line with the empirical …ndings of Gompes and Lerner (2000) . In contrast, we …nd also in the dominant …rm game that the leader (this time always the dominant …rm) will select the highest value projects, and the follower will sometimes select intermediate value projects that were rejected by the leader.
In the dominant …rm model, there is a new motive for the follower to select rejected projects. The follower faces an inferior (right-censored) distribution of projects, and therefore is less selective than the dominant …rm. As a result, the follower will want to select some projects that the dominant …rm rejects. When there are no payo¤ externalities ( = 0), the dominant …rm would have no reason to keep its rival busy, as it is always the one who gets to choose …rst. So the only reason for the intermediate range to arise is the inferior distribution that the follower faces. For other values of ; or if the dominant …rm has a higher probability of being the leader, but still less than 1, both forces could be present
Let us assume now that …rm A is a dominant …rm; when its resources are not committed, …rm A is always the …rst to consider a project. If it rejects the project, …rm B, the follower, can decide whether or not to select it.
In state (1; 1) ; no …rm can select a project. The value in state (1; 1) is thus given by:
In states (0; 1), and (1; 0); the …rm who is not committed can either select the project and immediately transition to the state (1; 1) where both …rms are committed, or reject and transition in the next period to one of the states where it is not committed. Hence, the thresholds for selecting projects are given by:
Accounting for these thresholds of selection for the non-committed …rm, the value functions in states (0; 1) and (1; 0) are:
and
In state (0; 0), …rm A decides …rst if to select the period's project. If …rm A rejects the project, then …rm B's selection threshold level is:
Returning to A's decision, if v v B 0;0 ; so that B will select if it has the opportunity to do so, then the leader …rm A would select this project if the following condition holds:
While in the symmetric case the leader never selects a project that would be rejected by the follower, with asymmetry this is not necessarily so. If v < v 
Concluding Remarks
Projects often requires …rms to commit limited resources, preventing them from selecting other projects while they are committed. Since more promising projects could arise during the time a …rm is committed to a project it selected earlier, constrained …rms would reject some pro…table projects.
The selection threshold of a single decision maker that can work on at most one project at a time is higher when project commitment is expected to last longer, or when the …rm is more patient. The reservation value is also higher for …rms that face a …rst order stochastically dominating distribution of project returns. A less constrained …rm, that has a two-project capacity, has lower selection thresholds than a one-project capacity …rm, even during a period when it is already committed to one project and has resources available only for one other project.
In a strategic environment, project selection by one …rm can change the pro…tability of a rival, as well as the rival's opportunity to take on projects. In the symmetric game, we show that a …rm may reject a project that will then be selected by a rival, as this can lessen future competition on projects. In an asymmetric game, the follower is less selective also because it faces an inferior distribution of projects.
Our paper provides new insights into the relation between market structure and innovations. We show that a duopolist has lower selection thresholds than an identical …rm who operates as a monopoly. Thus competition induces more projects to be selected, but the average quality of projects selected by the monopolist is higher. If however the monopolist is less constrained and has a two-project capacity, or equivalently if the two …rms are able to jointly make selection decisions, then the selection thresholds of the single less constrained decision maker are lower than in the non-cooperative equilibrium.
In attempting to maintain tractability and a simple exposition, we made certain simplifying assumptions. In our model, if the …rm is committed to a project, it cannot select another project until the commitment ends. In reality, it is likely that …rms can at some cost be released from a previous commitment. We analyzed the case in which the cost of abandoning a project is high enough so that the commitment is always binding. More generally, when the cost is not too high, if a new project of high enough return arises, the …rm might …nd it worthwhile to abandon an old project and select the new. We expect the results to be qualitatively similar, with perhaps lower selection thresholds because the commitment is less binding. A formal analysis is left for future work. 10 In analyzing strategic interactions, our model assumes sequential decisions. We argue that in many economic environments this assumption is reasonable, e.g., clients likely approach service providers sequentially. However, there may be some markets in which …rms simultaneously decide on project selection, or the order of sequential move might be endogenous as well. If, in each period, …rms simultaneously decide on selection, and each gets the project with equal probability when they both attempt to select, we expect there to be a range of intermediate project returns for which …rms randomize the decision to select.
Our analysis is focused on the strategic behavior of the …rms that select projects. If, however, project opportunities arise when independent innovators propose them, they might also act strategically so as to extract surplus from the selecting …rms. The game played in each period might take the form of an auction or a bargaining game in such circumstances.
These extensions are interesting directions for future work. 10 When there is a cost to abandon the project, and project returns are only obtained conditional on the project being completed, the problem becomes much more complex because in addition to the thresholds of a free …rm, in a committed state, the …rm's threshold for abandoning the current project for a new project depends on the expected return of a current project.
A Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. (i) Re-arranging (1) and (3) and then substituting into (2), we obtain the following implicit de…nition of the selection decision threshold v 0 :
From (25) ; we know that v 0 is the solution to g(x) = 0 where g(:) takes the following form:
Evaluating g(x) at x = 0 and at x = v; we …nd that g(0) < 0 and g(v) > 0: Additionally,
This implies that for given and p; there exists a unique solution to (26) in the range (0; v).
(ii) Consider g(v 0 ; ; p) as de…ned in (25) ; only accounting for ; p as arguments of the function. Implicit di¤erentiation of g(v 0 ; ; p) = 0 shows that:
From the proof of (i), we know that
Similarly,
(iii) Consider two cumulative distribution functions F a and F b ; de…ned on the interval (26) with the distribution F i ; i = a; b. Using integration by parts, we rearrange the function g i and write it as:
Therefore 
Hence,
by (28) 0:
; which is the desired conclusion.
Proof of Proposition 2. When p = 1; we have w 1 = w 0 = 0: Consider p < 1: Using (5) ; we can re-write (6) as follows:
Similarly, using (7) ; we can re-write (8) as follows:
Substituting the two equations above into (7) and re-arranging, we get:
Again, substituting (4) ; (7) and (29) into (5) ; we get:
Substituting (31) into this expression and re-arranging, we get:
We re-write (31) and (32) substituting the increasing function g (:) that was de…ned in we know that g (w 1 ) < 0: It follows that:
This implies that v 0 > w 1 > w 0 because g (:) is increasing.
Proof of Lemma 1. An equilibrium is de…ned by the system (9)- (16) . Accounting for corner solutions, we re-write the thresholds as: Thus the system of equations that de…nes the equilibrium can be reduced to a system of 4 equations in these 4 unknowns. We substitute (9) into (11) and (12) to obtain this system in values fV 1;1 ; V 0;1 ; V 1;0 ; V 0;0 g:
where the thresholds are given above. The right hand side is a continuous function from the compact set (9)- (16) and it is therefore an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 4.
By ( 
It is easy to verify that given j j < 1, v 2 0;0 = v 0;1 = e v will be a solution to the system i¤ p = 1: Suppose p < 1:
By (35) and (36) ;
Thus, for p = 0; we have v 0;1 = e v and for p > 0 we have either v 
If v 2 0;0
Also, we know > (1 ) 2 because 2 ( 1; 1) ; which implies, 2 (37) ; we get the following: 
(1 p)
Implicitly di¤erentiating the three equations above with respect to the parameter ; we get: Note that:
Hence, when p = 0; the denominator in the comparative statics becomes: 
Since the denominator is strictly positive for p = 0; by continuity, it is strictly positive for p close enough to 0 as well. Also,
Hence, 
This implies that v 1 0;0 < v 0 : Proof of Proposition 7.
We adapt the system of equations for the two-project capacity version so that for a project of return v; the payo¤ of the joint venture is (1 + ) v;
which is the sum of payo¤s of the two …rms when one …rm selects. The de…nition of W 2 does not change and is given in (4) . The revised equations for the other values are: (1 + ) w 1 = (pW 0 + (1 p) W 1 ) W 2 (41)
We now follow three steps to prove this proposition.
Step 1: We argue that the optimal project selection strategy of the two-projects capacity …rm yields a value that is at least as large as the sum of equilibrium values of the two …rms in the game, W 0 2V 0;0 : The reason why this is true is that the two-projects capacity decision maker can mimic the selection behavior of the strategic …rms by setting thresholds: satis…es the system of equations (4), (39) and (40) that de…nes values for given thresholds in the two-projects capacity problem. Because the two-projects capacity decision maker can achieve at least 2V 0;0 in state 0, it must be that in the optimal strategy, W 0 2V 0;0 :
Step 2: We have shown in Proposition 4 that v We subtract V 0;0 from both sides of (16), rearrange and substitute (13) and ( Where the last equality is derived from (40) and (42). But we argued that W 0 2V 0;0 ; a contradiction! Hence, it must be that w 0 < v 2 0;0 :
Step 3: We argue that because v 2 0;0 > w 0 ; it must follow that v 0;1 > w 1 : By contradiction, if it was the case that v 0;1 w 1 ; then using the de…nition of g (:) in (26) 
